This paper provides preliminary observations from data involving a cartel in the international maritime shipping of chemicals. These data provides a setting in which to consider how the presence of a cartel affects market conduct following its dissolution and, in turn, how this might be affected by the obligations imposed on firms who seek leniency. The patterns in the data are consistent with cartel distortions persisting in the post-cartel period, possibly due to the presence of long-term contracts. An implication is that, in addition to terminating involvement in cartel activity, some social benefit may accrue from requiring firms seeking leniency to mitigate the harm caused by cartel actions.
Introduction
Cartel enforcement continues to be a significant focus of competition authorities globally. In many jurisdictions involvement in a cartel carries with it the possibility of a jail sentence for individuals, in addition to fines for the companies involved. In the US criminal culpability is accompanied by a leniency program that allows a company and its employees to gain immunity from prosecution if they are the first to alert the DoJ to the presence of the cartel and take 'prompt and effective action to terminate [the firm's] part in the anticompetitive activity being reported upon discovery of the activity.'
1 Similar programs have been adopted in several other jurisdictions.
2
A significant body of research has arisen seeking to understand the incentives created by leniency and the optimal structure of these programs (see, for instance, Aubert et al. (2006) , Chang and Harrington (2009) , Chen and Harrington (2005) , Harrington (2008) , Motta and Polo (2003) and the survey by Spagnolo (2008) ). At the same time, a stream of recent empirical work on cartel activity has examined specific cartels leveraging high quality data on the internal structure of the cartel in an effort to gain an empirical understanding of how cartels' structure interacts with their impact on markets. For instance, in Asker (2009) a bidding cartel that operated in the auctions for collectable postage stamps was examined. This cartel used a knockout auction to coordinate ring activity, the design of which reflected the cartel design proposed by Graham et al. (1990) , which considered a bidding cartel that used a mechanism implementing the Shapley value to arrive at a division of surplus within the cartel. An interesting implication of this cartel structure is that bidders in the auction who bid against the cartel appear to suffer damages of at least the same magnitude as the sellers of the stamps for sale. The detailed record of bidding in the knockout auction, side payments, and purchase prices at auction allows the quantification of these effects. Other recent studies of cartels that leverage similarly detailed data on the internal working of cartels include Genesove and Mullin (2001) and Roller and Steen (2006) . This paper provides preliminary observations from data that speak to both of these streams of the cartel literature. The data is drawn from one particular case, involving a cartel in the international maritime shipping of chemicals. This case is interesting in that there was a lag of nine months between one of the firms in the cartel discovering (and stopping) the illegal activity and that firm's application for leniency. This provides a provocative setting in which to consider how the presence of a cartel affects market conduct following its dissolution and, in turn, how this might be affected by the obligations imposed on firms who seek leniency.
The paper proceeds by describing the cartel, then describing the data set used to examine post-cartel conduct. The patterns in the data are consistent with cartel distortions persisting in the post-cartel 
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3 The corollary to this observation is that, in addition to terminating involvement in cartel activity, some social benefit may accrue from requiring firms seeking leniency to mitigate the harm caused by cartel actions.
The cartel and the parcel tanker industry
The cartel considered in this paper occurred in the parcel tanker industry. Parcel tankers are ships that transport a variety of chemical and liquid products. They are distinguished from commodity or bulk chemical tankers in that they have many holds on the one ship and carry many different types of chemicals or liquids at the same time. For instance, among the 59 ships in the deep-sea fleet operated by Odfjell Tankers (one of the conspirators) in 2002, ships had between 22 and 52 separate holds. Indeed, the Odfjell 2002 annual report claims that: 'Odfjell carries over 500 different generic products every year, ranging from various organic chemicals such as alcohols, acrylates, aromatics as well as fuel oil, lubricating oils, vegetable oils and inorganic chemicals like sulphuric and phosphoric acids and caustic soda.' [at p. 47] Transported chemicals can require special handling conditions, including stainless steel tanks, and controlled temperatures and pressures.
4 Individual loads shipped via parcel tankers typically range from 150 tons to 40,000 tons. Ships collect and deliver chemicals at specialized terminals, some of which are owned by the same company as owns the ship.
Contracting for transportation services occurs in one of two ways: Companies seeking to ship chemicals can either buy transportation on a specific ship in a spot market or can enter into a contract of affreightment, which is an agreement to transport set quantities of cargo during a given time period, where the shipping company has discretion over the ships to be used to fulfill the contract. These contracts typically last for a year. 5 In its 2002 Annual Report Odfjell claims that 55% of shipping was covered by a contract of affreightment, leaving 45% for the spot market. ('Stolt' and 'Odfjell' hereafter) . A third company, Jo Tankers, was a smaller, but active market participant. In August 1998 executives from Stolt and Odfjell met to establish a cartel to rig the bidding for contracts of affreightment. This was done by dividing existing clients between the two companies according to the various trade routes that the companies operated. This market division agreement was recorded in a set of lists. Each company was able to bid for the affreightment contract of the companies allocated to them, on the routes indicated, without competition from the other. For instance, in this first set of lists Stolt was allocated Dupont on US Gulf to Far East routes. This meant that Stolt could bid an Dupont contracts to ship chemicals from US Gulf ports to Far East ports without competitive pressure from Odfjell. In practice this would work by Odfjell not entering a bid. In the event that they were specifically asked to bid, Odfjell would contact Stolt first to make sure that their bid would not win. The customer lists were revised in 2000 and again in March through May of 2001. 8 Some time shortly after the 1998 agreement between Odfjell and Stolt, Jo Tankers began participating in the cartel, although on a less formal basis, without explicit customer lists being drawn up.
Importantly, the bid rigging was only for contracts of affreightment and only for existing customers. New customers' contracts were competitively bid. Similarly, regional trade, on routes not covered by the customer lists, was competitively bid.
In April 2001, the chairman of the tanker division of Stolt asked an employee to evaluate the profitability of the cartel agreement of Odfjell. The report, concluding that the agreement was profitable, was discovered by the Stolt general counsel in mid January, 2002. After reading the report the general counsel reported his concerns about a potential antitrust violation to the chairman of the Stolt tanker division. On March 1st the general counsel resigned and filed a constructivedischarge lawsuit. In a subsequent revision, on November 1, 2002, of the claims made in pursuit of this lawsuit the general counsel alleged 'ongoing criminal conduct in violation of antitrust laws'.
In February 2002, Stolt terminated their collusive conduct, rewrote their antitrust compliance guidelines, and engaged in a series on internal seminars that communicated the importance of antitrust compliance. This compliance activity occurred through April 2002. The effectiveness of this activity was disputed by the US Department of Justice in US v Stolt-Nielsen et al; however, the judge in that matter found that 'The Antitrust Compliance Policy was effective in transforming Stolt-Nielsen's corporate culture and reforming its business practices. It drastically altered the nature of Stolt-Nielsen's contacts with its competitors. While competitors continued to initiate collusive contacts, Stolt-Nielsen employees repeatedly refused to engage in anticompetitive discussions with them, and reported any such contacts to their superiors in compliance with the Antitrust Compliance Policy.' 9 In March 2002, Stolt executives met with Odfjell and Jo Tanker executives to inform them of their exit from the cartel.
Importantly, there is no evidence that clients of any of Stolt, Odfjell or Jo Tanker were aware of the cartel at the time that Stolt ceased to participate in the cartel. Indeed, the first evidence of clients being aware of the cartel followed an approach by a class-action attorney to a Stolt client, prompted by the revised claims in the dismissal case initiated by the Stolt general counsel on November 1, 2002.
On November 22 Stolt external counsel contacted the US Department of Justice regarding the alleged cartel activity.
10 A 'marker' was granted on December 17, 2002. 11 On January 15, 2003 the US Department of Justice granted leniency to Stolt in relation to 3 Other explanations are also explored including capacity constraints, equilibrium selection and Harrington's (2004) idea that firms may strategically manipulate post-cartel conduct to reduce estimated damages (and hence, fines) in any subsequent prosecution. 4 The ships used to transport these chemicals on deep sea routes range from 10,000 to 45,000 deadweight tons (dwt) and average 170 m long and 25 m wide. Deadweight tons measure of the weight carrying capacity of the ship. The total dwt is the weight of the cargo the ship can carry plus fuel, fresh water, spare parts and similar operational needs. By way of comparison, the largest crude oil carriers are around 500,000 dwt, 420 m long and 60 m wide.
5 See Stolt-Nielsen Annual Report 2002, at p. 20. 6 Similarly, in its 2002 Annual Report Stolt reports that in 2002 67% of all tanker revenue was collected under a contract of affreightment. In 2001 the figure was 54%.
7 Ibid, at p. 17.
the cartel activity. As a result of the subsequent investigation, Odfjell was fined USD42.5 million, two Odfjell executives were fined and served jail time, Jo Tankers was fined USD19.5 million and one Jo Tankers executive was fined and served jail time. Fines were also imposed by the European Commission in a parallel investigation.
Data
To investigate how the dissolution of the cartel affected subsequent market conduct, data were obtained from Lloyds Maritime Intelligence Unit (LMIU). LMIU maintain a proprietary database of all ships in commercial use in the world (any ship eligible for an International Maritime Organization registration number). These data cover the ownership of each ship, ship characteristics (size, capacity, flag, etc.), and a detailed record of the ships' movements. LMIU maintains a network of agents that record the date of arrival and departure of all vessels entering and exiting over 3000 ports around the world.
Data on all tanker movements in 2001 and 2002, together with ownership data and ships characteristics, were obtained from LMIU. The tankers in this data range from Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC's) to chemical tankers to the more obscure specialist fruit juice and wine tankers. 528,717 movements of 6367 vessels in and out of 2926 ports are described in these data.
To extract the Odfjell and Stolt fleets from these data, fleet lists in Annual Reports and SEC 20F filings were used. Consultation of these sources is necessary since chartering is a common practice in this industry and using ownership data is not enough to extract complete fleet lists. Jo Tankers, being a private company, does not have to make these disclosures and hence the analysis focuses on the interaction between Odfjell and Stolt, who are, in any case, considerably larger operators. 
Preliminary observations
Examination of the data begins by looking at worldwide shipping patterns during the cartel and then examines specific routes that are of particular interest given the structure of the cartel agreement. gives an appropriate indication of the impact of the cartel's dissolution on shipping activity by region. Of particular interest are changes in shipping activity that lie outside the usual change in shipping activity from one period to the next. To obtain a measure of normal variation, the proportional change in shipping activity was computed for both companies between the first and second halves of 2001, in each region. The average of the absolute value of this change, across regions is 33%. Any proportional change larger than this in absolute value is termed a 'large' change.
Setting aside regions with low shipping volumes (less than 25 departures in every period), there are eight regions in which large changes occurred: Odfjell experienced large increases in regions 2 and 24 and a large decrease in region 6; while Stolt experienced a large increase in region 20 and large decreases in regions 5, 10, and 13. It is notable that, assuming that demand in each market was relatively stable, none of these changes in activity suggest that the market share of one firm was being increased at the expense of the other. This suggests that fluctuations were, at least in part, due to demand changes, changes in competition by other competitors, or some other factor.
The preceding analysis gives an overview of shipping activity at a global and regional level. The results are consistent with the dissolution of the cartel having little impact on shipping activity by Stolt and Odfjell. Ideally, these aggregated measures should be followed by more detailed market-level analysis. Given that the cartel operated by defining markets (shipping routes) and dividing clients seeking affreightment contracts on these routes, the dissolution of the cartel may have affected the pattern of activity on specific routes in ways that may not appear in aggregated measures.
The structure of the cartel agreement between Stolt and Odfjell allows more detailed analysis to be conducted on specific routes. When Stolt and Odfjell split markets occasionally the client divisions were very unequal. Three routes are particularly striking in this regard: Far East to South America (exclusively served by Stolt); Middle East to the Far East (exclusively served by Odfjell); and the US Gulf to the Mediterranean (exclusively served by Stolt). On each of these routes, under the cartel agreement, either Stolt or Odfjell were allocated clients while the other firm had none. The extreme imbalance in client allocations under the cartel agreement suggests that these would be natural markets in which to see readjustments (either entry or increased activity) following the cartel's dissolution. The Far East to South America route does not carry enough traffic to support any conclusions. 15 Hence, attention is directed to the remaining two routes. Fig. 2 shows voyages from US Gulf ports to Mediterranean ports. US Gulf ports are defined as region 23 (as per deadweight tonnage departing each day. On this route, under the cartel agreement, Stolt was assigned clients for affreightment contracts and Odfjell was assigned none. It is striking that Odfjell has no shipping activity on this route, either before or after the cartel's dissolution. This is despite having an active presence at both US Gulf and Mediterranean ports (see Table 1 ). The bottom panel of Fig. 2 , which plots the activity of other chemical tankers, indicates that other firms were also servicing this route. The fact that Odfjell has no activity on this route is doubly striking when it is recalled that the cartel agreement only covered bidding for contracts of affreightment, which typically last one year. Activity in the spot market for chemical shipping was not prohibited by the agreement. As noted earlier, in its 2002 Annual Report Odfjell claims that 55% of shipping was covered by a contract of affreightment, leaving 45% for the spot market.
17 Nonetheless, Odfjell was not active in the US Gulf to Mediterranean market during 2001 or 2002. Fig. 3 shows voyages from the Middle East (regions 1 and 15) to the Far East (regions 7, 12 and 19). Here Odfjell was allocated clients while Stolt was allocated none. The pattern in the data, in which Stolt has a consistently lower activity level, is consistent with this allocation. Although less extreme than Fig. 2 , there is no indication in Fig. 3 of activity changing after the dissolution of the cartel. 
Implications
The patterns in the data outlined above are consistent with the dissolution of the cartel having little impact on market conduct. Other data may be available, which may either support or reject this working hypothesis. For instance, the US Census keeps data on exports gathered from customs forms, which are sufficiently detailed so as to allow shipments, shipper and ship to be matched. 19 This would allow the shipping activity of the individual clients mentioned in the cartel agreement to be tracked, and hence the distortion, if any, caused by the cartel to be viewed at a more granular level on routes originating in the US. In pursuing this approach, an empirical difficulty 18 The lack of Odfjell activity on this route in January 2001 is odd and, other than being consistent with a drop in activity industry wide, has no easy explanation. 19 Given that these customs forms are in the public record it is unclear whether normal census confidentiality limits apply. is raised by Harrington (2004) who considers the possibility that firms manipulate conduct post-cartel to minimize fines imposed during subsequent prosecution. Given investigations of cartel conduct often exploit the existence of known competitive and collusive phases, this observation raises a disturbing identification problem for most empirical studies of cartel damages. 20, 21 With these caveats in mind, and given that the data at hand suggests little immediate impact on market conduct from the dissolution of the cartel, this section considers why cartel-like activity may persist post-cartel and the implications that this persistence has for the enforcement of anti-cartel laws.
22
At least three possible reasons for the persistence of cartel-like activity are suggested by the parcel shipping case (and doubtless others exist, especially in other contexts). Each raises the concern that a cartel may yield benefits to cartel members even after it has been dissolved, albeit through different channels.
First, the affreightment contracts are long term agreements lasting, typically, one year. This means that, should these contracts persist, inefficiency generated by the cartel may continue until the contract terminates.
23 It is worth being clear about the source of distortion arising from these contracts. The affreightment contract is for the shipment of a fixed quantity over a set period of time in exchange for a lump sum payment. This means that the cost is sunk once the contract is entered into. Hence, after the contract comes into effect, the marginal cost of shipping units up to the contracted quantity is zero. Beyond that quantity, the marginal cost is set by the spot rate. A distortion will arise when the expectation of a high cartel-induced affreightment price results in the client contracting for the shipment of a quantity lower than would otherwise be the case. This raises the marginal cost of shipping units in the range between the quantity contracted under cartel conditions and the quantity contracted in the absence of the cartel. This distortion may be further exacerbated if firms plan future production before the affreightment cost is sunk or if risk associated with volatility in the spot price of shipping imposes additional costs. This source of distortion can be mitigated post-cartel if the affected contracts can be renegotiated. While parties can try to renegotiate a contract at any time, it is unlikely that they would try to do so unless they knew something about the contracting environment had changed. Being made aware of the cartel's existence would constitute such a change, both because it changes expectations over the path of prices and also because there is some basis in law for affected contracts to be challenged.
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In the parcel tanker case, Stolt benefited from leniency granted by the Department of Justice. A condition of leniency is that the party receiving leniency takes 'prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the anticompetitive activity being reported upon discovery of the activity [emphasis added]'. In the Stolt case the judge noted that the range of conduct required to be undertaken to fulfill this obligation is unclear. However, it is clear that making the anticompetitive conduct public knowledge and unraveling existing, affected contracts is not required. While Stolt informed Odfjell and Jo Tankers of their withdrawal from the cartel in March 2002, it appears that clients did not learn of the cartel until it became public in November 2002.
The obligation to cease collusive conduct, coupled with a lack of any obligation to mitigate any ongoing harm, creates a lacuna in anticartel policy and in the administration of the leniency program in 25 The extent to which this harm persists must depend, at least to some extent, on whether clients know of the cartel and the extent to which the relevant law allows the existing contracts to be rescinded and renegotiated. 26, 27 The effect of merely informing the market as to the existence of previous cartel activity is dramatically illustrated in Christie and Schultz (1995) , who show that publicity regarding implicit collusion among NASDAQ market makers caused spreads to halve overnight.
Requiring immediate disclosure to affected parties, once a firm has discovered collusive conduct, amounts to publicizing the conduct before leniency is given. This suggests that such a duty would, at the very least, increase the cost of applying for leniency by increasing the probability of private antitrust suits.
28 , Grasso (2008) suggests a similar disincentive arising from the discoverability of EC leniency notices in US courts in private antitrust actions. He argues that applying for leniency in the EC makes it easier to get sued in the US.
A more palatable alternative may be to create incentives to get parties to seek leniency as soon as possible after conduct is discovered. This would allow leniency to be granted together with a condition that long-term contracts be renegotiated in a timely fashion. Incentives for the quick application for leniency may be created if the extent of leniency were related, in some fashion, to the delay in applying for leniency.
Any adjustment to the leniency program is not without cost. The harder, more complicated, or more costly it is to meet the requirements of leniency, the fewer firms may seek it. While, as a matter of theory, the effects of leniency provisions on cartel formation are somewhat uncertain (see, for instance, Chang and Harrington (2009)) , there seems to be some consensus that some form of leniency is socially beneficial, a conclusion supported in recent empirical work (Miller 2009 ). To this end, changing the terms of leniency involves evaluating delicate trade-offs between deterrence, detection, prosecutorial success and harm mitigation.
Three other possible reasons for the lack of change in market conduct following the Stolt-Odfjell cartel dissolution suggest themselves.
First, investment may lead to capacity constraints, which in turn retard adjustment to the new equilibrium. The parcel tanker industry requires large fixed assets (ships) that are relatively specialized. To the extent that re-equilibrating requires more or different ships, it may take time to adjust. In the meantime, seemingly collusive patterns of conduct may persist. 29 Second, the cartel may have operated as an equilibrium selection device. That is, firms need to choose where to enter and how. In this environment the cartel may operate to coordinate play so that a particular equilibrium in the entry game is selected. Whether this gives rise to any antitrust harm depends on the theory of equilibrium selection in the absence of a cartel.
These two hypotheses are distinct from the earlier focus on longterm contracts in that they suggest little adjustment to current practice in granting leniency but rather present some conceptual challenges in assessing damages. That is: how should lengthy adjustment times and equilibrium selection be treated when assessing damages from cartel behavior? Tackling these issues raises challenging modeling and measurement problems. Finally, Harrington (2004) makes the point that firms may delay reverting to competitive practices post-cartel (in effect engaging in behavior similar to implicit collusion) to avoid signaling that there was a cartel occurring and to diminish the magnitude of any inferred damages (and hence fines) should the cartel be discovered and prosecuted. These data generate patterns that one might expect should this have been the case. 29 Fershtman and Pakes (2000) present a somewhat related dynamic model, in which firms set prices and invest in product quality. In this market a cartel, operating using a grim-trigger strategy, can generate a Markov Perfect equilibrium that is less concentrated and generates higher consumer surplus than does a competitive counterpart. 30 Harrington (2004) raises a related point when observing that cartels have an incentive to manipulate prices post-cartel to minimize damages estimates in litigation. 
